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Abstract 
Brain imaging studies suggest that truth telling constitutes the default of the human 
brain and that lying involves intentional suppression of the predominant truth response. By 
manipulating the truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we investigated whether the 
dominance of the truth response is malleable. Results showed that frequent truth telling made 
lying more difficulty, and that frequent lying made lying easier. These results implicate that 1) 
the accuracy of lie detection tests may be improved by increasing the dominance of the truth 
response and that 2) habitual lying makes the lie response more dominant.  
 
  
Brain imaging studies on deception show that (1) lying is associated with activity in 
prefrontal brain regions (anterior cingulate, dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior frontal 
regions) that are critically involved in cognitive control, and (2) no area of the brain is 
systematically more active for truth telling than for deception (Christ, Essen, Watson, 
Brubaker, & McDermott, 2009; Spence & Kaylor-Hughes, 2008). These findings suggest that 
the truth constitutes the default of the human brain, and that lying involves intentional 
suppression of the predominant truth response. A long standing question is whether the truth 
is always the dominant response or whether deception may constitute the default in habitual 
or pathological liars (Dike, Baranoski, & Griffith, 2005; Grubin, 2005; Yang & Raine, 2006; 
Yang, et al., 2007). The present study is the first to examine whether the dominance of the 
truth response is malleable. This investigation also has important applied implications for lie 
detection: Malleability would suggest that the dominance of the truth response can be 
enhanced, thereby improving the diagnostic accuracy of lie detection. 
Method 
We examined whether response latencies and accuracy for truthful and deceptive 
answers to a critical set of questions in the Sheffield lie test (Fullam, Mckie, & Dolan, 2009; 
Spence, et al., 2001; Spence & Kaylor-Hughes, 2008; Spence, Kaylor-Hughes, Brook, 
Lankappa, & Wilkinson, 2008) were affected by a set of filler questions that either required a 
truth response or a lie response. Therefore, undergraduate students were randomly assigned to 
the frequent truth (n = 21), the frequent lie (n = 22), or the control condition (n = 20). They 
either received a monetary reward or course credit for their participation. After providing 
written informed consent and baseline information on 72 daily activities (i.e., Did you buy a 
newspaper?), participants performed a Sheffield lie test that consisted of 180 trials (see 
Footnote1): 72 test, 72 filler, and 36 catch trials, in random order. The 72 test trials consisted 
of 36 questions on daily activities that were presented twice, once requiring a truthful, and 
once requiring a lie response. The questions appeared centrally on the screen, with the 
possible responses appearing left (Yes) and right (No) below the questions. Crucially, the 
response labels appeared in yellow or in blue, and participants had been instructed in advance 
that one colour required a truthful response, and the other a lie (colours were 
counterbalanced). Acquisition of the colour rule was verified through a practice phase (error 
percentage during the last 12 practice trials: M = 13% SD = 9%). To manipulate dominant 
response strength, there were 72 filler trials, consisting of 36 questions that were presented 
twice. In the frequent lie condition, all filler questions required a lie response, in the frequent 
truth condition they all required a truthful response, and in the control condition they equally 
often required a lie and a truth response. Finally, to prevent strategic recoding of the task, 
there were 36 catch trials: The words Yes or No were presented centrally on screen (Johnson, 
Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2003). Participants were instructed to respond according to their meaning 
(i.e., press the Yes button for the word Yes, press the No button for the word No), irrespective 
of the colour of the response labels. 
Results 
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The data of the filler trials were discarded (see Footnote2). Both the error rates and the 
response latencies of the test trials were analyzed by means of a 2 (Deception: Lie vs Truth) x 
3 (Condition: Frequent lie vs. Frequent Truth vs. Control) mixed-model ANOVA. For the 
reaction time analyses, errors were discarded. To reduce the impact of outlying values, 
response latencies faster than 300 ms and slower than 3000 ms were recoded to 300 ms and 
3000 ms, respectively (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).  
In line with our expectations, the ANOVA for the error rates showed a significant 
interaction between Deception x Condition, F(2, 60) = 12.41, p < .001 (see Panel A of Figure 
1). Relative to the control condition, the “lie effect” (deception minus truth) was enhanced in 
the frequent truth condition, t(30.74) = 1.99, p = .05, and reduced in the frequent lie condition, 
t(41) = 6.33, p < .001. The lie effect was small in the control condition, one sample t(19) < 
1.30, Cohen’s d = 0.29, but very large in the frequent truth condition, t(20) = 7.41, p < .001, d 
= 1.65. The lie effect was reversed in the frequent lie condition t(21) = 1.75, p = .09, d = - 
0.32.  
The ANOVA for response latencies showed a main effect of Condition: Compared to 
the control condition, response latencies decreased in the frequent truth condition, t(39) = 
2.34, p < .05, d = 0.73, and increased in the frequent lie condition, t(40) = 1.81, p = .08, d = 
0.56. More importantly, as can be seen in Panel B of Figure 1, the expected interaction 
between Deception and Condition was also significant, F(2, 60) = 10.95, p < .001. This 
interaction was mainly due to a greater lie effect in the frequent truth condition than in the 
control condition, t(30.37) = 2.82, p < .01, the lie effect in the frequent lie condition did not 
differ significantly from that in the control condition, t(40) = 1.60, p = .12. The lie effect size 
more than doubled from the control condition, t(19) = 3.47, p < .01, d = 0.77, to the frequent 
truth condition, t(20) = 11.75, p < .001, d = 2.57. The lie effect was no longer significant in 
the frequent lie condition, t(21) = 1.67, p = .11, d = 0.36.  
Discussion 
Assessing cognitive complexity with response latencies and accuracy (Donders, 
1868/1969), the results of the control condition replicate previous research by showing that 
lying is more difficult and comes with a cognitive “cost”: Lying is slower and less accurate 
compared to truth telling (for a review see Verschuere & De Houwer, 2011). Critically, truth 
proportion affected behavioral responding in the Sheffield lie test: Frequent lying made lying 
easier whereas frequent truth telling made lying more difficult. This data pattern shows that 
the strength of the dominant truth response is malleable.  
The findings in the frequent truth condition suggest that the accuracy of lie detection 
tests may be improved to a significant extent by increasing the dominance of the truth 
response. A great advantage of the proportion manipulation is that it can be easily extended to 
other response measures (e.g., fMRI;  Spence, et al., 2001) and other deception paradigms 
(e.g., memory detection; Lykken, 1959; Verschuere, Ben-Shakhar, & Meijer, 2011). A 
challenge for the application in real-life settings is the requirement of a set of filler trials with 
known ground truth. Resembling our manipulation, one could use pieces of information that 
the suspect does not deny, and that can be verified independently. The suspect may, for 
example, recognize having been at the crime scene at the time of the crime. Such information 
(e.g., “I was in Central Park around 10pm”) could be used as a filler trial when testing for 
crime involvement (e.g., “I physically assaulted Mr. X“). If further research would show that 
overlap in time and content between test and filler trials is not necessary, applied 
implementation would even become much easier, because then, any proposition (”I’m in front 
of a computer”) can be used as a filler. 
Even though the truth may constitute the default under normal conditions, the findings 
in the frequent lie condition suggest that habitual lying makes lying easier. The effects were 
most pronounced for the behavioral errors, where the cognitive cost that comes with lying not 
just diminished, but in fact reversed. Indeed, participants in the frequent lying condition made 
more errors for truth telling than for lying. That this change in the ease of lying was obtained 
using only 72 filler trials, challenges the argument that the default mode would be 
unchangeable, as postulated by Johnson and colleagues: “…even after thousands of trials of 
practice, it is unlikely that the increased difficulty associated with making deceptive responses 
will be erased entirely (Johnson, Barnhardt, & Zhu, 2005; p. 402)”. Admittedly, for response 
latencies, the effects were less clear cut. Although the lie effect was no longer significant in 
the frequent lie condition, and the size of the lie effect in the frequent lie condition was halved 
as compared to the control condition, statistical comparison between the control condition and 
the frequent lying condition failed to reach significance. By extending the amount of filler 
and/or test blocks, future work could verify whether our findings can be replicated in the 
response latency domain. 
In sum, by manipulating truth proportion in the Sheffield lie test, we demonstrate the 
of the dominant truth response, implying that 1) the accuracy of lie detection tests may be 
improved by increasing the dominance of the truth response and that 2) with habitual lying, 
the lie moves toward becoming the dominant response. 
Footnotes 
1. Due to a programming error, 34 participants were given only 168 trials.  
2. Analyses on the filler trials in the control condition, showed that lying differed 
significantly from truth telling in accuracy, t(19) = 2.07, p = .05, d = 0.43, and 
response latency, t(19) = 5.75, p <. 001, d = 1.30. The lie effect of the filler 
trials was related to that of the test trials for response latency, r = .58, p < .01, 
but not accuracy, r = .36, p = .11. 
 
Acknowledgement 
Bruno Verschuere and Adriaan Spruyt are Postdoctoral Fellows of the Scientific 
Research Foundation - FWO. Preparation of this paper was supported by grants 
BOF/GOA2006/001 and BOF09/01M00209. We would like to thank Helen Tibboel and Bram 
Van Bockstaele for their aid in collecting the data. 
 
References 
Christ, S. E., Essen, D. C., Watson, J. M., Brubaker, L. E., & McDermott, K. B. (2009). The 
contributions of prefrontal cortex and executive control to deception: Evidence from 
activation likelihood estimate meta-analyses. Cerebral Cortex, 19, 1557-1566. 
Dike, C. C., Baranoski, M., & Griffith, E. E. H. (2005). Pathological lying revisited. Journal 
of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 33, 342-349. 
Donders, F. C. (1868/1969). On Speed of Mental Processes. Acta Psychologica, 30, 412-431. 
Fullam, R. S., Mckie, S., & Dolan, M. C. (2009). Psychopathic traits and deception: 
functional magnetic resonance imaging study. British Journal of Psychiatry, 194, 229-
235. 
Greenwald, A. G., Nosek, B. A., & Banaji, M. R. (2003). Understanding and using the 
implicit association test: I. An improved scoring algorithm. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 85, 197-216. 
Grubin, D. (2005). Commentary: Getting at the truth about pathological lying. Journal of the 
American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 33, 350-353. 
Johnson, R., Barnhardt, J., & Zhu, J. (2003). The deceptive response: effects of response 
conflict and strategic monitoring on the late positive component and episodic 
memory-related brain activity. Biological Psychology, 64, 217-253. 
Johnson, R., Barnhardt, J., & Zhu, J. (2005). Differential effects of practice on the executive 
processes used for truthful and deceptive responses: An event-related brain potential 
study. Cognitive Brain Research, 24, 386-404. 
Lykken, D. T. (1959). The GSR in the detection of guilt. Journal of Applied Psychology, 43, 
385-388. 
Spence, S. A., Farrow, T. F. D., Herford, A. E., Wilkinson, I. D., Zheng, Y., & Woodruff, P. 
W. R. (2001). Behavioural and functional anatomical correlates of deception in 
humans. Neuroreport, 12, 2849-2853. 
Spence, S. A., & Kaylor-Hughes, C. J. (2008). Looking for truth and finding lies: The 
prospects for a nascent neuroimaging of deception. Neurocase, 14, 68-81. 
Spence, S. A., Kaylor-Hughes, C. J., Brook, M. L., Lankappa, S. T., & Wilkinson, I. D. 
(2008). 'Munchausen's syndrome by proxy' or a 'miscarriage of justice'? An initial 
application of functional neuroimaging to the question of guilt versus innocence. 
European Psychiatry, 23, 309-314. 
Verschuere, B., Ben-Shakhar, G., & Meijer, E. (Eds.). (2011). Memory detection: Theory and 
application of the Concealed Information Test. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Verschuere, B., & De Houwer, J. (2011). Detecting concealed information in less than a 
second: Response-latency based measures. In B. Verschuere, G. Ben-Shakhar & E. 
Meijer (Eds.), Memory Detection. London: Cambridge University Press. 
Yang, Y. L., & Raine, A. (2006). What is pathological lying? Reply. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 189, 86-86. 
Yang, Y. L., Raine, A., Narr, K. L., Lencz, T., LaCasse, L., Colletti, P., et al. (2007). 
Localisation of increased prefrontal white matter in pathological liars. British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 190, 174-175. 
 
 
  
Figure1. Mean error percentage (Panel A) and response latencies (Panel B), with standard 
error of the mean, for lying and truth telling in the frequent lie, frequent truth, and control 
condition 
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